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CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM,
ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS, AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: RESUSCITATING
THE THIRD EXCEPTION
DANIEL B. ROTH*

INTRODUCTION

In August 2004, Wisconsin Right to Life (WRL), a 501(c)(3)
organization,' sought to air television and radio advertisements urging the
citizens of Wisconsin to call their senators and tell them to vote to end the
Democratic Party's filibuster of judicial nominees.2 Unfortunately, the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) determined that the advertisement was
an "electioneering communication" under the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Act (BCRA) and prevented WRL from airing the advertisement because the
blackout period for "electioneering communications" had begun. 3 WRL
sought an injunction that would have allowed the advertisements to air, but a

* J.D. Candidate, May 2006. The author would like to thank his family for the love
and support they give him everyday and four of the best friends a fellow law student could
ever have, Chuck, Joe, Michael, and Nick, for just being there.
1. A 501(c)(3) organization is named for the section of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC) under which it is organized. The section provides that nonprofit organizations
created for a specific purpose can be tax exempt, provided they follow certain regulations,
including a prohibition on participation in "any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office." I.R.C. § 501 (2000).
2. Michael Janofsky, Group Plans to Challenge Law on Blackout Periodfor Ads,
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2004, at P6. While portions of this advertisement will be referred to
later, the transcript of one of WRL's ads is as follows:
Pastor: And who gives this woman to be married to this man?
Bride's Father: Well, as father of the bride, I certainly could. But instead, I'd like to
share a few tips on how to properly install drywall. Now, you put the drywall up...
Voice-over: Sometimes it's just not fair to delay an important decision. But in
Washington it's happening. A group of senators is using the filibuster delay tactic
to block federal judicial nominees from a simple "yes" or "no" vote. So qualified
candidates don't get a chance to serve. Yes, it's politics at work, causing gridlock
and backing up some of our courts to a state of emergency.
Bride's Father: Then you get your joint compound and your joint tape and put the
tape over...
Voice-over: Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the
filibuster.
George Will, Speech Crime in Wisconsin, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 2004, at 72.
3. Id.
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three-judge panel denied the request. 4 WRL next appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which determined that it lacked
jurisdiction over the matter.5 WRL then asked Chief Justice Rehnquist for
an injunction which, in an opinion in chambers, he denied. In addition, the
Court's ruling in McConnell v. FEC probably means that WRL would lose a
Supreme Court appeal, even if the Court granted a writ of certiorari.7
In passing the BCRA, Congress limited the periods in which political
groups may advertise their cause and urged like-minded citizens to contact
their congressmen. The purpose of the law was to stop advertisements that
only appeared to rally support for an issue, while, in fact, actively
8
By doing so, Congress has
campaigning for or against the incumbent.
9
water.
bath
thrown the baby out with the
This comment proposes a narrowly-tailored exception to the BCRA
that would differentiate between those advertisements that truly seek to rally
support for an issue and those that do so as a mere pretext to campaign
against a candidate. Part I provides a brief history of campaign finance
reform and a discussion of the BCRA within the context of its creation of
"electioneering communication," how the FEC has chosen to enforce the ban
on "electioneering communications," and the Supreme Court's finding that
the rule is constitutional. Part II features an analysis of the Supreme Court's
shift in First Amendment analysis from Buckley v. Valeo to McConnell and
an analysis of the proposed and rejected exception to "electioneering
Part III proposes a
communications" for true issue advertisements.
narrowly-tailored exception to "electioneering communications" for true
issue advertisements and illustrates its potential effectiveness.

4. Judges Refuse to Lift BCRA Ad Blackout for 'Grassroots' Lobbying, POL. FIN.,
THE NEWSL., Aug. 2004.
5. Wis. Right to Life v. Fed. Election Comm'n, No. 04-5292, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS
18795 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 1, 2004).
6. Wis. Right to Life v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 125 S. Ct. 2 (2004) (opinion in
chambers) (Rehnquist, Cir. J.).
7. Id.
8. Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190, 65,201 (Oct. 23, 2002).
9. The "fake" issue advertisement that commentators reference most frequently was
an advertisement that attacked Rep. Bill Yellowtail's personal life. The transcript of the
advertisement is as follows:
Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but he took a swing at his wife.
Yellowtail's explanation? He "only slapped her," but her nose was broken. He
talks law and order, but is himself a convicted criminal. And though he talks about
protecting children, Yellowtail failed to make his own child support payments, then
voted against child support enforcement. Call Bill Yellowtail and tell him we don't
approve of his wrongful behavior. Call (406) 443-3620.
Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/PoliticsLine, 77 TEX. L. REV.
1751, 1751 (1999). This advertisement was seen as such a prime example of the failure of
the system that, although quoted slightly differently, it appears in both a Senate RepGrt on
campaign finance abuses and the Supreme Court decision in McConnell v. FEC. S. REP.
No. 105-167, vol. 5, at 6305 (1998); McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93,
194 n.78 (2003) (quoting the same Senate report).
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN REGULATION
A.

Early Attempts At Reform

Congress first attempted to regulate campaign financing by passing the
Tillman Act of 1907.' ° The Tillman Act intended to completely prohibit
federal election activity by corporations." Congress next passed the Federal
Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 (FCPA).12 This Act comprehensively
regulated federal elections through candidates and their campaigns.13 The
next act of Congress affecting campaign financing was the Taft-Hartley
Act,1 4 which permanently extended the prohibitions of FCPA to labor
unions.15 Taft-Hartley was the last regulation of campaign finance before the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).16 FECA expanded the
regulations to include political organizations. 7
In 1974, Congress amended FECA 8 and, in doing so, directly regulated
speech for the first time. It did so in Section 101 by providing that no person
could independently (i.e. without the knowledge or request of a candidate)
spend more than $1,000 during the course of a year to seek either the
election or defeat of a "clearly identified candidate."' 19 A laundry list of
plaintiffs20 challenged FECA and its 1974 amendments in Buckley v. Valeo.2'
10. Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (repealed 1971).
11. Id. at 864-65. See Robert L. Kerr, Subordinatingthe Economic to the Political: The
Evolution of the Corporate Speech Doctrine, 10 COMM. L. & POL'Y 63, 68-89 (2005)
(discussing the history of the regulation of corporate political speech).
12. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (repealed
1971).
13. Id.
14. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (repealed
1971).
15. Id. at 159-60.
16. Federal Elections Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat 3 (1972)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 2, 18, 28, 42, and 47 of the U.S. Code).
17. Id. at 11-16.
18. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat.
1263 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of titles 2, 18, 28, 42, and 47 of the
U.S. Code).
19. Id. at 1265. The text of the amendment provides:
(e)(1) No person may make any expenditure (other than an expenditure made by or
on behalf of a candidate within the meaning of subsection (c)(2)(B)) relative to a
clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other
expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat
of such candidate, exceeds $1,000.
Id. The section goes on to state that one may clearly identify a candidate by mentioning
the name of the candidate, showing a picture or drawing of the candidate, or using an
"unambiguous reference" that makes the identity of the candidate obvious. Id. For a more
in-depth discussion of FECA and its 1974 amendments, see Bryan R. Whittaker, Note, A
Legislative Strategy Conditioned on Corruption: Regulating Campaign Financing after
McConnell v. FEC, 79 IND. L.J. 1063 (2004) (discussing the social and political events
that led up to FECA and its 1974 amendments).
20. The Supreme Court took the time to list some of them in the decision:
Plaintiffs included a candidate for the Presidency of the United States, a United
States Senator who is a candidate for re-election, a potential contributor, the
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Buckley v. Valeo and its aftermath

Buckley v. Valeo was a landmark decision in which the Supreme Court
held that spending money could, in certain circumstances, qualify for the
same protection as speech.22 The Court found that, although Congress's
interest in preventing the appearance of corruption was sufficient to allow
restrictions on contributions,23 there was no rational relation between that
interest and restrictions on expenditures. 4
With this holding, the Court invalidated the prohibition of substantial
independent expenditures. 25 However, before engaging in the balancing test
that it used to determine the outcome, the Court, in dicta, discussed whether
a restriction worded similarly to the one present in Section 101 of the
amendment2 6 could be constitutional. 27 The Court said that the phrase
"relative to" contained within Section 101, and not defined in the Act, was
too vague unless "relative to" meant "advocating the election or defeat of'
based upon the wording of the section. The Court then determined that the
section was still too vague, as there was no means to determine what
constituted "advocacy., 29 The Court then decided that, in order to
appropriately protect First Amendment rights, precedent required the
advocacy to be express.3° In a footnote, the Court listed the following words
of express advocacy: "'vote for,' 'elect,' 'support,' 'cast your ballot for,'
'Smith for Congress,' 'vote against,' 'defeat,' [and] 'reject."' 3' The Court
ruled that whenever advocacy was not express, it was issue advocacy and

Committee for a Constitutional Presidency - McCarthy '76, the Conservative Party
of the State of New York, the Mississippi Republican Party, the Libertarian Party,
the New York Civil Liberties Union, Inc., the American Conservative Union, the
Conservative Victory Fund, and Human Events, Inc.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 (1976).
21. Id.
22. The Court in Buckley found that any money spent in the form of either
contributions (money given directly to parties) or expenditures (money spent in
furtherance of the election of a candidate but without his knowledge or cooperation) are an
exercise of First Amendment rights. Id. at 14-23. See Whittaker, supra note 19, at 106775 (discussing, at length, Buckley's holding that money could be speech). See also Raleigh
Hannah Levine, The (Un)Informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme Court's Electoral
Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 225, 262-69 (2003) (suggesting Supreme Court
decisions regarding political speech fall into the framework of whether the Court believes
the population to be either well or poorly informed).
23. The Court found that contributions only invoked freedom of association, for which
regulation is justified on the government's showing that it has a significant and important
interest in regulation. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-25.
24. In regard to expenditures, the Court found that freedom of speech directly came
into play because the law restricted ads, pamphlets, and similar items, and therefore, the
government had a higher burden to meet in order to justify regulation. Id. at 44-51.
25. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 51.
26. See supra text accompanying note 19 (quoting the wording of the act).
27. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 39-44.
28. Id. at 41-42.
29. Id. at 42-43.
30. Id. at 43-44.
31. Id. at 44 n.52.
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subject to First Amendment protection.32 This same logic was applied to the
definition of "expenditure, 3 33 4which then required that an "expenditure"
amount to "express advocacy.
After the Supreme Court ruled on FECA and its amendments, Congress
amended it one more time in 1976. 35 The 1976 amendments included a
recodification of Taft-Hartley's provision banning election related activities
by corporations and unions and placed this regulation at 2 U.S.C. 441(b).36
2 U.S.C. 441(b) faced a constitutional challenge in FEC v. Mass.
Citizens for Life. 37 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL) was a
nonprofit corporation organized under Massachusetts law. 3'
MCFL
produced a newsletter that listed all of the candidates in the Massachusetts
primary election of 1978 and indicated whether they were pro-life. 39 The
FEC saw this action as a violation of 2 U.S.C. 441(b) and sued for civil
damages, as provided under FECA. 40 The Supreme Court found that, within
the Act, political activity meant advocacy. In doing so, the Court relied on
Buckley's requirement that the statement must amount to express advocacy. 4'
The Court went on to formally adopt the words in Buckley's footnote fiftytwo as a test for express advocacy, but also allowed for further examination
if the communication did not contain those words.42 The Court, however,
found that FECA could not apply to MCFL, primarily because it was a
32. Id. at 39-44.
33. FECA defined expenditure as any attempt to influence the outcome of an election
through the use of money or other valuable objects. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat at 12.
34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 78-80. For an additional discussion of Buckley and its
holdings concerning expenditures, see Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is Dead, Long Live
Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. Federal Election

Commission, 153 U PA. L. REV. 31, 35-39 (2004) (discussing the holding of Buckley);
Scott Holleman, Regulating the Mother's Milk of Politics: Why Washington's Campaign
FinanceLaw Constitutionally ProhibitsState PartiesFrom Spending Soft Money on Issue

Ads, 80 WASH. L. REV. 191, 194-202 (2005) (discussing Buckley's holdings with regard to
contributions and expenditures); Cecil C. Kuhne, III, Restricting Political Campaign
Speech: The Uneasy Legacy of McConnell v. FEC, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 839, 842-45
(discussing Buckley); Robert F. Bauer, When "The Pols Make the Calls": McConnell's
Theory ofJudicialDeference in the Twilight of Buckley, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 5, 6-9 (2004)
(discussing Buckley).

35. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat.
475 (1976) (codified as amended scattered throughout titles 2, 18, 28, 42, and 47 of the
U.S. Code).
36. Id. at 490.
37. Mass. Citizens for Life v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
38. Id. at 241.
39. Id. at 243-44.
40. Id. at 244-45.
41. Id. at 248-50.
42. Id. See James Bopp. Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, The FirstAmendment is Still Not a
Loophole: Examining McConnell 's Exception to Buckley 's GeneralRule ProtectingIssue

Advocacy, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 289, 291-96 (2004) (discussing the relation between the
"express advocacy" of Buckley and MCFL 's expenditure requirements). See also Andrew
Pratt, Comment, The End of Sham Issue Advocacy: The Case to Uphold Electioneering
Communications in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 87 MiNN. L. REV. 1663,

1669-71 (2003) (discussing MCFL's application of the express advocacy test).
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nonprofit corporation and therefore fell outside the intent of the statute.43
Over time, the courts strictly adhered to the words of Buckley, which resulted
in the "magic words" doctrine." This doctrine stands for the idea that
footnote fifty-two in Buckley lists the "magic words" that serve to distinguish
"express advocacy," which Congress may restrict, from "issue advocacy,"
which receives First Amendment protection.45
C. Modern Calls For Change
Because the "magic words" doctrine allowed the most vicious
advocacy advertisements to be classified as issue advertisements,46 Congress
felt changes needed to be made. The end result was the BCRA.47 A central
provision of the BCRA created the term "electioneering communication,"
which is any television or radio advertisement that clearly makes reference to
a candidate or candidates for federal office (i.e. something as simple as "your
Congressman" or "the Democratic candidate for Senate") in the viewing area
43. Mass. Citizens for Life, at 263-65. The court outlines a three-part test to analyze
FECA's ban on express advocacy. Id. The first part is whether the corporation was
established to promote political ideas and not for the purposes of engaging in business
activities. Id. Second, the corporation has no shareholders or other persons who "have a
claim on its assets or earnings." Id. Third, the corporation was not established by a
business or union and actively engages in a policy of not excepting donations from those
groups. Id. at 264. See Bauer, supra note 34, at 10 (discussing the MCFL Court's decision
to carve out an exception and how there was clearly no Congressional intent to provide
such and exception).
44. See Scott E. Thomas & Jeffery H. Bowman, Is Soft Money Here to Stay Under the

"Magic Words" Doctrine, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 33 (1998) (discussing the "magic
words" doctrine, its historical development, and how its application serves as a loophole in
campaign finance reform); Richard Briffault, McConnell v. FEC and the Transformation
of Campaign FinanceLaw, 3 ELECTION L. J. 147, 155 (2004) (discussing the magic words
doctrine).
45. Thomas, supra note 44 at 34.
46. In 1998, only four percent of ads used Buckley's "magic words," and yet in the

final two months of the 2000 election, ninety-five percent of political ads mentioned a
candidate for office and ninety-four percent of those either attacked or supported that
candidate. 147 CONG. REC. S2433, S2458 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Snowe). See Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: Limits and
Opportunitiesfor Non-Profit Groups in FederalElections, 31 N. Ky.L.REV. 243, 250-54

(discussing "sham issue ads" and giving statistics regarding their frequency in the 2000
election). See also Briffault, supra note 9, at 1751-56, (discussing the prevalence of "sham
issue ads," which are advocacy ads that look like issue ads); Richard L. Hasen, The
Suprisingly Complex Casefor Disclosureof Contributionand Expenditures FundingSham
Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. REv. 265, 276-83 (2000) (discussing the ease with which

groups can avoid the restrictions of express advocacy by the creation of "sham issue ads");
Pratt, supra note 42, at 1675-78 (discussing and providing examples of sham issue ads).
Furthermore, in the 2000 Republican Presidential Primary, Sen. John McCain, co-author
of the BCRA, was the victim of a highly publicized sham issue ad, paid for by Bush
supporters, attacking McCain's environmental record while promoting then-Governor
George W. Bush's record on the same subject. Richard Perez-Pena, The 2000 Campaign:
The Ad Campaign;Air of Mystery Clouds Shot at McCain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2000, at

A15.
47. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of titles 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47).
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of the station where the advertisement is broadcast.48 Additionally, an
advertisement is only an "electioneering communication" if it is broadcast
"60 days before a general, specific, or runoff election" or "30 days before a
primary or preference election. ' 49 Foreseeing constitutional challenges and a
potential invalidation of "electioneering communication," BRCA provides a
second definition. It is any television or radio advertisement that, regardless
of express advocacy, promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a candidate,
and cannot be construed in any manner other than to urge the public to vote
5 1
50
This definition includes no time restriction.
for or against a candidate.
The BCRA also provides several exceptions to "electioneering
communications," including a delegation of power to the FEC that allows the
FEC to create its own exemptions, so long as those exemptions do not
exempt advertisements that "promote, support, attack, or oppose a Federal
candidate., 52 With regard to "electioneering communications," the BCRA
bans any "electioneering communication" that corporate or union funds pay
for, either directly
or through non-profit organizations that accept donations
53
from them.

The FEC did create several exceptions. The most notable was the
exemption of 501(c)(3) corporations,54 in addition to the BCRA's exemption

48. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2000);11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (2004)(general definitions for
the Federal Election Commission). The term "electioneering communication" was meant
to expand the Supreme Court's definition of express advocacy. 147 CONG. REc. S3022,
S3036 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. McCain); Electioneering
Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,131, 51,132 (Aug. 7, 2002) (commentary on definition
codified at 11 C.F.R. 100.29). See Spencer Overton, Restraintand Responsibility: Judicial
Review of Campaign Reform, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 663, 672-73 (2004) (stating the
term "electioneering communication" expands the definition of express advocacy); Pratt,
supra note 42, at 1666 (claiming "electioneering communications" was meant to eliminate
the distinction between issue and express advocacy). However, one commentator has
claimed that "electioneering communications" is not an expansion of express advocacy,
but rather an attempt to carve out an exception to Buckley's constitutional mandate of
"express advocacy." Bopp, supra note 42, at 291-318. He then claimed McConnell was
incorrect because Buckley provided no grounds for an exception. Id.
49. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i)(II); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29. See Lillian R. BeVier,
McConnell v. FEC: Not Senator Buckley's First Amendment, 3 ELECTION L. J. 127, 13627 (2004) (defining electioneering communication); Overton, supra note 48, at 672-73
(discussing the definition of "electioneering communication"); Levine, supra note 22, at
272-73 (discussing the definition of "electioneering communication"); Briffault, supra
note 44, at 156 (discussing the definition of "electioneering communication"); Whittaker,
supra note 19, at 1084-85 (defining "electioneering communication").
50. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii).
51. 149 CONG. REC. S5738, S5740 (daily ed. May 5, 2003) (statement of Sen.
McCain). See also Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190, 65,191 (Oct. 23,
2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. § 100.29) (giving the alternative definition, and stating
that it would not appear in the CFR unless the primary definition is ruled unconstitutional).
52. Electioneering Communication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,196; 2 U.S.C. 434(f)(3)(B)(iv).
53. §§ 203(b)-204, 116 Stat. 90-91; 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c) (2000).
54. See supra text accompanying note 1 for a brief description of 501(c)(3)
organizations.
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of 501(c)(4) 55 and 52756 corporations." However, the BCRA prevents such
nonprofit corporations from making "electioneering communications" if they
accept corporate or union funds and intermingle them with individual
contributions and make "targeted communications," the definition of which
encompasses all "electioneering communications." 58 WRL does accept
corporate donations and does not separate them.59
The FEC created a list of proposed exceptions and ultimately rejected
the third proposed exception, which would have covered the issue
advertisements that are the topic of this comment. 60 There were four
variations of the third exception, but they all served the same purpose: to
exclude any advertisement that made reference to a pending legislative or
executive issue and was clearly only meant to urge citizens to voice their
opinion. 6 The commission determined all of these exceptions to be either
too vague or outside the scope of its power.62
D. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
Once the BCRA was 3igned into law, Senator Mitch McConnell and a
host of other plaintiffs filed suit. They claimed that several provisions,
including the definition of "electioneering communications" and the ban of
those communications when paid for by corporate money, were
unconstitutional.63 The Court disagreed, reasoning that the definition was
55. A 501(c)(4) organization is a non-profit "civic league or organization" that
promotes the "social welfare" whose funds are used for "charitable, educational, or
recreational purposes." I.R.C. § 501 (2000).
56. A 527 organization is a political organization that is considered to be exempt from
income taxes other than the taxes provided for in section 527 of the Internal Revenue
Code. I.R.C. § 572 (2000). Most notably, such organizations are allowed to attempt to
influence elections at any level, unlike their 501(c)(3) counterparts. Id.
57. Electioneering Communication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,199, 65,200; 11 C.F.R.
§ 100.29(c)(6).
58. §§ 203(b)-204, 116 Stat. 90-91; 2 U.S.C. § 441b(c).
59. Will, supra note 2, at 72.
60. Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201.
61. Id. The four alternatives of this exception can be broken down into two groups.
The first group consists of alternatives 'A' and 'B', which deal only with pending
legislation or executive decisions. Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 51,131,
51,145 (Aug. 7, 2002) (rejected in 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190, 65,201-02). 'A' would require
that the advertisement make no attempt to judge the candidate or his position on the issue.
Id. 'B' would require that the advertisement mention only the candidate's name as a
means of urging the public to call and suggest the position the candidate should take, and
provide no additional information about the candidate. Id. The second group, consisting
of alternatives 'C' and 'D', does not place the pending restriction on the issue of the ads.
Id. 'C' would forbid "express advocacy" and require the advertisement to provide contact
information for the target of the ad, along with a statement urging the public to use it. Id.
'D' would require that the advertisement provide only the name of the candidate, with an
urge to contact him and would forbid any reference to "past or present positions." Id.
62. Electioneering Communication, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201, 65,202.
63. Neil A. Lewis & Richard A. Oppel Jr., Campaign Finance: The Overview; Mixed
Ruling on Constitutionalityof New Campaign Finance Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2003, at

Al. See Kerr, supra note 11, at 89-99 (discussing McConnell's holdings with regard to
corporate speech).
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not vague because any reasonable person could easily determine what was
64
It also held that Buckley's
and was not an "electioneering communication.,
65
"express advocacy" was not a constitutional mandate, but a statutory one.
The Court, however, refused to discuss the sufficiency of the alternative
66
definition because it upheld the primary definition. Next, the Court stated
that the nonprofit restrictions on "targeted communications" were subject to
MCFL67 analysis.68 Finally, the Court ruled that Congress's interest in
preventing corporations and unions from unduly influencing an election is
69
significant enough to outweigh the opposing First Amendment interests.
This drew a vigorous dissent from Justice Kennedy, who worried about the
BCRA's impact on true issue advertisements and the impact on Buckley's

64. McConnell, 540 U.S.

at

194.

65. Id. at 191-93. However, this served to overrule precedent in the majority of
circuits of the United States Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm. v.
Sorrell, 221 F.3d 376, 386 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding facially unconstitutional a law that
banned certain expenditures for political ads unless its reach was limited to express
advocacy); Iowa Right to Life Comm. v. Williams, 187 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir. 1999)
(holding the Constitution requires that any prohibition on political speech be limited to
express advocacy); Chamber of Commerce v. Moore, 288 F.3d 187, 193 n.6 (5th Cir.
2002) (citing the holding of Iowa Right to Life above with approval); Faucher v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 807 F.2d 857, 859 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding the First Amendment
prohibited restrictions from being placed on speech relating to political issues); Citizens
for Responsible Gov't State PAC v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1187 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding the Constitution requires that no limitations be placed on issue ads); Brownsburg
Area Patrons Affecting Change v. Baldwin, 137 F.3d 503, 505-06 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding
the First Amendment requires protection of speech related to political issues). For a more
comprehensive list of federal cases with this holding, including district court cases, see
Bopp, supra note 42, at 298 n.36 (listing in great detail federal cases holding that the First
Amendment is implicated in the distinction between express advocacy ads and issue ads).
66. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190 n.73.
67. Mass. Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. 238.

68. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 208-12. See Holman, supra note 46, at 285 (discussing the
BCRA's regulation of non-profit groups along with the McConnell decision's impact on
those regulations).
69. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 204-08. For more comprehensive discussions of
McConnell's holdings, see Levine, supra note 22, at 273-75 (arguing that McConnell
represents a shift in how the Supreme Court views the electorate); Briffault, supra note 44
(discussing the holdings of McConnell); BeVier, supra note 49, at 135-45 (discussing
McConnell's holdings and their ramifications); Whittaker, supra note 19, at 1086-1103
(discussing the holdings of McConnell with respect to money as speech). See generally
Bopp, supra note 42, at 300-09 (discussing the various holdings of McConnell and how
they compare to precedent, as it existed prior to McConnell). The Court also returned to
the argument of whether the appearance of corruption is a sufficient justification to allow
the regulation of expenditures. The Court, without expressly overruling Buckley, found
Congress's interests sufficient to support regulation where Buckley had found it
insufficient. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 156. See BeVier, supra note 49, at 135-36
(discussing McConnell's holding with respect to appearance of corruption); Whittaker,
supra note 19, at 1088-92 (discussing McConnell's finding of a sufficient interest to
regulate); Briffault, supra note 44, at 161-67 (discussing McConnell's finding of a
sufficient interest in preventing the appearance of corruption); Bopp, supra note 42, at 339
(discussing McConnell's newfound deference to preventing the appearance of corruption).
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holding that Congress's interest in preventing the appearance of corruption
70
does not outweigh First Amendment interests.
Thus, when WRL sought to air its advertisement, the Supreme Court
had already issued a decision directly on point finding the definition of and
blackout period for "electioneering communications" contained in the BCRA
was constitutional. Due to the fact that WRL's challenge came less than one
year after the decision in McConnell, WRL had little chance of any court
granting an injunction that would have allowed the advertisement to air.
II.

BUCKLEY AND MCCONNELL: CONSISTENCY WITHIN APPARENT
CONTRADICTION

A.

FirstAmendment Implications of Campaign FinanceReform

Whenever Congress attempts to regulate speech, it must adequately
protect the rights provided in the First Amendment. 71 This is especially
critical when the speech is of a political nature, because political speech was
the prime concern of the Founding Fathers in drafting the First
Amendment. 72 Besides restraining freedom of speech, the Court has found
that regulation of political activity also restrains freedom of association.73
Any limitation on financial political activity restrains freedom of association
because contributions allow an individual to associate himself with a specific

70. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 286-288, 320-42 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice
Kennedy's dissent ended up being somewhat prophetic when he remarked that the
definition of "electioneering communications" "makes it a felony for an environmental
group to broadcast an ad, within 60 day of an election, exhorting the public to protest a
Congressman's impending vote to permit logging in national forests." Id. at 287. For an
in-depth comparison of Justice Kennedy's dissent and the majority opinion, see Overton,
supra note 48, at 679-92 (discussing the majority opinion in McConnell and comparing it
to Justice Kennedy's dissent). Justice Kennedy's dissent has received some attention in
articles that denounce the decision in McConnell. See Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v.
Federal Election Commission: Ideology Trumps Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L. J.
345, 348-50 (2004) (discussing where the dissent in McConnell differed from the
majority); Levine, supra note 22, at 273 (discussing Kennedy's above-mentioned fear of
what the BCRA had made a felony).
71. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.50 (7th
ed. 2004). The portion of the First Amendment pertinent to this paper is: "Congress shall
make no law... abridging the freedom of speech... or the right of the people [to] peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
72. NOWAK, supra note 71, § 16.50; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15; McConnell, 540 U.S.
at 206.
73. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22-23. Freedom of association is never directly mentioned in
the First Amendment; however, the court has found that the right is implied within the
First Amendment. NAACP v. Alabama, 356 U.S. 443, 60-61; NOWAK, supra note 71,
§ 16.41. This is because many of the activities protected by the First Amendment (i.e.
religion, peaceable assembly) require people to associate with one another. NOWAK,
supranote 71, § 16.41.
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allow the individuals to expose
candidate, while independent expenditures
74
their concerns to the general public.

75
Despite the general prohibition of the First Amendment, the Court has
found that where there is a substantial government interest, regulation can be
proper.76 When it comes to the regulation of political campaigns, the
purpose Congress cites is the prevention of corruption or the appearance of
corruption." The sufficiency of this interest and whether the legislation has
a rational relation to it have been the determinative issues in the question of
whether Congress had the constitutional ability to create the regulations in
question. 78 Ultimately, the inconsistencies between the decisions in Buckley
and McConnell have resulted from the way the Court has balanced
congressional and First Amendment interests. Buckley provided greater
emphasis on the First Amendment to the extent of overprotection, whereas
McConnell provided great deference to congressional interest to the
detriment of the First Amendment. However, neither decision reaches an
appropriate middle ground that the FEC - although it took no action - felt
might be necessary. 79

74. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 22-23. See Levine, supra note 22, at 263-64 (discussing
Buckley's holding that freedom of association was invoked by both contributions and
expenditures, but was more prevalent in expenditures); Robert F. Bauer, McConnell,
Parties,and the Decline of the Right ofAssociation, 3 ELECTION L. J. 199, 200-03 (2004)

(discussing, at length, the treatment of the right of association in the McConnell decision);
Samuel Issacharoff, Throwing in the Towel: The Constitutional Morass of Campaign

Finance, 3 ELECTION L. J. 259, 260-61 (2004) (discussing the First Amendment
implications of the BCRA as considered in McConnell).
75. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (stating "Congress shall make no law").
76. NOWAK, supra note 71, § 16.50; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-45; McConnell, 540 U.S.
at 204. See also Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 49, 52 (1919) ("The question in every
case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent.").
77. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-47; McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142-45; NOWAK, supra note
71, § 16.50. See also 147 CONG. REC. S2433, S2444 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement
of Sen. Feingold) (stating that the only permissible purpose for regulating campaigns is to
prevent corruption or the appearance thereof); 147 CONG. REC. S3022, S3040 (daily ed.
Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Edwards) (stating the Supreme Court agrees that the
prevention of corruption or the appearance thereof is a compelling interest that warrants
regulation); 147 CONG. REc. S3233, S3236 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Kohl) (stating that it is an important goal of Congress to prevent the appearance of

corruption); 148 CONG. REC. S2096, S2099 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Dodd) (discussing the importance of preventing a public perception of corruption by
regulating political campaigns).
78. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-16, 44-51; McConnell 540 U.S. 312-16, 204-07.

See

Levine, supra note 22, at 265 (discussing Buckley's holding that government interests did
not justify regulations on expenditures).
79. Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,136, 51,145. See also
Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201-02 (rejecting the proposed

exceptions).
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The Ineffective Rule of Buckley

When the Buckley Court ruled that the only constitutional definition of
expenditure was the use of funds to expressly advocate the election or defeat
of a candidate,8 ° it erred on the side of overprotection of rights to the
detriment of true congressional concerns. When the Court discussed the
prohibition on expenditures greater than one thousand dollars and laid out
the express advocacy framework, it admitted that by only regulating express
advocacy, the rule could easily be circumvented by someone who could
choose his words well. 8' The Court used this rationale to strike down the
provision, and yet the Court chose to define expenditures throughout FECA
using the "express advocacy" framework, after admitting how easily it could
be circumvented. 82 By accepting an admittedly flawed framework, the Court
was clearly protecting speech at the cost of congressional interest.
The Court was certainly reasonable in protecting the rights involved for
two basic reasons. First, FECA did not distinguish between the methods by
which an organization can reach out to the public. 83 This led the Court to
consider the impact that FECA would have on an organization seeking to
purchase a full-page advertisement in a large city's leading newspaper and
an organization that took it upon itself to print a leaflet.8 4 The enforcement
of FECA would lead to a decrease in the amount of public political speech,
which the First Amendment was designed to protect in its entirety. 85
Second, the Court took a "show me" approach to congressional interest,
pointing out that any discussion of corruption was not backed by concrete
evidence, but rather stemmed from a purely speculative standpoint.86 Given
that the Court was confronted with a law that would reduce political speech
and a congressional interest that was based entirely on speculation, the Court
had no choice but to protect the First Amendment rights.
C. McConnell Overcompensatesfor Buckley's Ineffectiveness
When the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in McConnell, it
overruled the doctrine of Buckley as it had developed over the previous
twenty-seven years. The Court did so through two specific determinations.
First, the Court, in balancing the First Amendment and congressional
interests, applied identical considerations as those in Buckley but reached the
opposite conclusion. 87 Second, when the Court upheld the definition of

80. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80-81; Hasen, supranote 46, at 276-83.
81. Buckley, 424 U.S. at45.
82. Id. at 80-81. See BeVier, supra note 49, at 139 (discussing how the Buckley Court
created the requirement of express advocacy out of the feeling that it was "impelled by the
powerful First Amendment interest in protecting the discussion of issues").
83. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-20.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 19, 20 n.20.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 45-47.
McConnell,540 U.S. at 204-07.
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"electioneering communication," it improperly applied the holding of
Buckley as refined through its progeny. 8
The Court in McConnell found that congressional interest in preventing
the appearance of corruption was sufficient to warrant restrictions on
The Buckley
expenditures relating to "electioneering communications.
Court concluded that an interest in preventing the appearance of corruption
9
was insufficient for regulation of expenditures. " While on their face these
two positions are inconsistent, they reflect the changes in how political
campaigns were run in the twenty-seven years between Buckley and
McConnell. The balancing of interests yields different results because of the
facts, not the issues. In McConnell, the Court addressed two post-Buckley
events that led to its change in position. First, spending on presidential
elections nearly doubled in each four-year cycle, to the extent that combined
91
political party expenditures reached nearly five hundred million dollars.
Second, a six-volume Senate report that totaled nearly ten thousand pages
detailed the impact that money had on the 1996 election, including instances
92
that created at least the appearance of corruption. This is in stark contrast
to the Buckley Court, which found no evidence suggesting the system created
even an appearance of corruption. 93 This, in and of itself, is not an
overruling of Buckley but rather a proper application of Buckley to a new set
of facts.94
88. Id. at 187-94.
89. Id. at 204-07.
90. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44-51.
91. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 302-04. See also 147 CONG. REC. S3022, 3034 (daily ed.
Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) (discussing how over five hundred million
dollars was spent on the 2000 election cycle and comparing it with spending in previous
years); Richard L. Hasen, Measuring Overbreadth: Using Empirical Evidence to
Determine the Constitutionality of Campaign Finance Laws Targeting Sham Issue
Advocacy, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1773, 1777 (2001) (discussing the ever-increasing amounts
of money spent on the elections including citing five-hundred nine million dollars as being
spent on the 2000 election cycle).
92. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 307-11. See 147 CONG. REC. S3233, 3248 (daily ed. Apr.
2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Levin) (detailing how special interest groups could purchase
access to politicians through "soft money" donations); 148 CONG. REC. S1991, S1996
(daily ed. Mar. 18, 2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd) (discussing the amounts of money
raised for the election and pointing out that most of it was used for what was considered
"issue advocacy"); Smith, supra note 70, at 162-63 (discussing specific portions of the
report that discussed how "soft money" could be used to obtain access to political figures,
which creates the appearance of corruption); Whittaker, supra note 19 at 1089-90
(discussing the Court's reference to donations used to purchase access to politicians). See
also Ellen L. Weintraub, Perspectives on Corruption, 3 ELECTION L. J. 355, 355-60 (2004)
(comparing the analysis with respect to corruption in the majority opinion and dissents of
McConnell).
93. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-47.
94. For contrary arguments, see Hasen, supra note 34, at 31-34 (2004) (arguing the

Court has abandoned the requirement that the law prevent corruption or its appearance and
instead adopted Justice Bryer's notions of a promotion of "political equality"); Yoav
Dotan, Campaign Finance Reform and the Social Inequality Paradox,37 U. MICH. J. L.
REF. 955, 955-69 (2004) (discussing McConnell as an apparent shift by the Court to a
notion of "political equality"); Bauer, supra note 34, at 17-29 (arguing the Court's

The John Marshall Law Review

[38:1315

The Court overruled Buckley when it ruled on the propriety of the
definition of "electioneering communication." The Court stated that "the
express advocacy restriction was an endpoint of statutory interpretation and
not a first principle of constitutional law." 95 This is true as far as the express
words of Buckley,96 but it fails to acknowledge that the U.S. Court of
Appeals routinely interpreted the distinction to be constitutionally
97
mandated.

The McConnell decision, however, was justified in light of the
definition of "electioneering communication."
What made the BCRA
different from the other campaign finance reforms was the fact that it used a
term that only applied to specific means of speech. When the Buckley Court
created the distinction between "issue advocacy" and "express advocacy," it
considered that FECA did not distinguish between the means by which the
speech would be disseminated. 98
The definition of "electioneering
communication" is strictly limited to radio and television advertising. 99

deference to Congressional judgement is in stark contrast to Buckley's use of a definition
of corruption to determine if such political action was conducive to corruption or its
appearance).
95. McConnell, 540 U.S. 189-91. See BeVier, supra note 49, at 137-38 (discussing the
Court's abandonment of the "express advocacy"/"issue advocacy" distinction). See also
Overton, supra note 48, at 672-73 (stating the term "electioneering communication"
extends the definition of express advocacy); Pratt, supra note 42, at 1666 (claiming
"electioneering communications" operates outside the distinction be between issue and
express advocacy).
96. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79-80. in Buckley, the Court specifically stated:
To insure that the reach of § 434 (e) is not impermissibly broad, we construe
"expenditure" for purposes of that section the same way we construed the terms of
§ 608 (e) - to reach only funds used for communications that expressly advocate
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.
Id. at 80.
97. See Hasen, supra note 46, at 277-78 (discussing lower court precedent claiming
Buckley's holding is an overriding constitutional principal); Hasen, supra note 91, at 1788
(discussing how lower courts have struck down attempts to regulate sham issue advocacy).
See generally Vt. Right to Life Comm., 221 F.3d 376; Iowa Right to Life Comm., 187 F.3d
963; Moore, 288 F.3d 187; Faucher, 807 F.2d 857; Citizens for Responsible Gov't State
PAC, 236 F.3d 1174; Brownsburg Area PatronsAffecting Change, 137 F.3d 503; Bopp,

supra note 42, at 298 n.36. In the debate over the BCRA, some of the opposing senators
also voiced a belief that the "express advocacy"/"issue advocacy" line was a constitutional
mandate. 147 CONG. REc. S3022, S3038 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Hatch); 147 CONG. REc. S3233, S3241 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 2001) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
98. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16-20.
99. 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2004); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29; Electioneering
Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,191, 65,192. See also BeVier, supra note 49, at 13627 (discussing the definition of "electioneering communication" including its limitation to
radio and television); Overton, supra note 48, at 672-73 (discussing the definition of
"electioneering communication," including its limitation to radio and television); Levine,
supra note 22, at 272-73 (discussing the definition of "electioneering communication,"
including its limitation to radio and television); Briffault, supra note 44, at 156 (discussing
the definition of "electioneering communication," including its limitation to radio and
television); Whittaker, supra note 19, at 1084-85 (defining "electioneering
communication," including its limitation to radio and television).
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However, the Court took this rationale one step further in ruling that
congressional prohibition of "electioneering communications" was proper.
The Court reasoned that such a ban was proper because "issue ads broadcast
during the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal and primary general
elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy."' 00 The Court
had earlier pointed out that market research suggested ads that amounted to
"issue advocacy" under Buckley's rules were more persuasive to the general
public than anything considered "express advocacy."'' 1 However, this claim
drew the ire of the dissenters as it blindly dismissed any notion that "issue
advocacy" might truly be just that - a group advocating its position on an
issue before Congress, which would deserve the strictest First Amendment
protections.l°2
Confronting the unfavorable developments in a post-Buckley world, the
Court swung the pendulum in the opposite direction by allowing overregulation. This, however, is not to say no one considered a middle ground.
D. Administrative Attempts at a Middle Ground

In implementing the BCRA, the FEC had the ability to consider
potential additional exceptions to "electioneering communications" and
proposed four potential exceptions for true "issue advocacy."' 0 3 All were
rejected for being outside the scope of the FEC's authority to create the

100. McConnell, 540 U.S. 205-07; Smith, supra note 70, at 156. See Pratt,supra note
42, at 1686 (citing statistics that show only 0.6% of advertisements run during the sixty
day window of the BCRA were "genuine issue ads"); Holman, supra note 46, at 250-54
(discussing the prevalence of "sham issue ads"). See also Joshua Downie, McConnell v.
FEC: Supporting Congress and Congress 's Attempt at Campaign Finance Reform, 56
ADMIN. L. REv. 927, 933-36 (discussing McConnell's upholding of "electioneering
communication"); Briffault, supra note 9 at 1751-56, 1782-88 (discussing the prevalence
of "sham issue ads," which are advocacy ads that look like issue ads, and how any
regulation, to be effective, must target the "sham issue ads" in a time frame close to the
election); Hasen, supra note 46, at 276-83 (discussing the ease with which groups can
avoid the restrictions of express advocacy by the creation of "sham issue ads").
101. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 125-27; see Holman, supra note 46, at 250-54 (discussing
the preference groups have for "sham issue ads"). See also Briffault, supra note 9 at 175156, 1782-88 (discussing the preference groups have for "sham issue ads,"); Hasen, supra
note 46, at 276-83 (discussing the ease with which groups create "sham issue ads").
102. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 286-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 8081. See Daniel H. Lowenstein, BCRA and McConnell in Perspective, 3 ELECTION L. J.
277, 279 (2004) (discussing the problems of the definition of "electioneering
communication"); BeVier, supra note 49, at 138-39 (discussing the importance of "issue
advocacy to the First Amendment"). For a brief, but interesting, argument concerning the
First Amendment analysis in McConnell, see Daniel R. Ortiz, The UnbearableLightness
of Being McConnell, 3 ELECTION L. J. 299, 302-04 (2004) (arguing that the Court chose
not to consider the regulations as regulating speech, but rather as a means of political
For an additional discussion of the FECA, BCRA, Buckley, and
participation).
McConnell, see Cecil C. Kuhne, Rethinking Campaign Finance Reform: The Pressing
Need for Deregulationand Disclosure, 38 J.MARSHALL L. REv. 633 (2004).
103. Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,136, 51,145; Electioneering
Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201.
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exceptions. 10 4 There was an additional problem with all four: they served to
open loopholes that would circumvent the system.
The first exception the FEC considered required that the advertisement
concern only current legislation, and only request individuals to contact their
representative.10 5 First, this exception, like the other three, fails to address
the possibility that the advertisement may use loaded words 10 6 to at least
create inferences in the minds of individuals as to a candidate's position.
Second, it places no restrictions on where the candidate's name may be
given, which would allow a well-written advertisement to create the
inference of a position. This specific alternative also fails to require the
organization to provide contact information. This is pivotal because without
requiring contact information, some viewers would take the message at face
value, not bother to look up contact information, and assume the candidate is
against their position. If the contact information is provided, there is at least
the possibility that more viewers will call and be given the representatives'
view of the situation.
The second exception required the advertisement to concern pending
legislation, request individuals to contact their representative and urge a
position without referencing the representative's position or political
abilities, and only to reference the candidate's name during the urge to
contact. 1° 7 This suffers from two of the deficiencies of the first alternative,
although curing the problem of potential repeated use of a candidate's name.
The third exception would have required the advertisement to make no
attempt at express advocacy, reference a specific "piece of legislation" or
08
issue, and give contact information while urging individuals to use it.
While this alternative cures the lack of contact information, it reinstates the
104. Electioneering Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201, 65,202. Even if the FEC
had determined that it had the power to create such an exception, it probably would not
have accepted a single one of them. Some commentators objected to the use of the
standard "promote, support, attack, or oppose" as inappropriate. Id. at 65,201. The third
alternative was praised by some as appropriate, while others claimed that it would have
allowed a complete circumvention of the BCRA. Id. Some argued the fourth alternative's
use of "incumbent legislator" would raise equal protection issues. Id. Commentators even
proposed a fifth possible alternative, that would have required the advertisement to be
"devoted exclusively to a pending legislative or executive branch matter" and only name
the candidate for the purposes of urging individuals to contact him, along with a
requirement that there be no mention of political parties or the candidates position or
abilities. Id. Some of those advocating this exception wanted to limit identification to
"[y]our Congressman." Id. This would tend to suggest that even if the FEC felt it could
exempt issue ads, it never would have come to a reasonable definition.
105. Id. at 65,201; Electioneering Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,145.
106. "Loaded words" is a term used to apply to words that have a strong connotation
that tends to invoke an emotional response from the listener. An extreme example of such
words would be if a group referred to abortion as "baby killing." See Jonathan S. Fox,
Push Polling: the Art of PoliticalPersuasion,49 FLA. L. REv. 563, 621 (1997) (discussing
the use of loaded words in push polling and using the "baby killing" example).
107. Electioneering Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,145; Electioneering
Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201.
108. Electioneering Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,145; Electioneering
Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201.
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problem of creative use of the candidate's name. It also removes the
requirement that the legislation be pending and replaces it with a requirement
that it only be "specific legislation." This opens the door to advocacy of
already-settled issues, which would amount to support or opposition of the
candidate.
The fourth exception would have required the advertisement to "urge
support or opposition" to legislation or an issue and to refer to a
representative and request individuals to urge support or opposition to the
legislation without mentioning their current position. 10 9 This exception
suffers from all of the problems of the third exception and also fails to
require that the advertisement provide contact information.
The Supreme Court had two opportunities to find a way to harmonize
legitimate congressional interests with the First Amendment, and has chosen
one doctrine that ineffectively enforces congressional interests and another
that restricts First Amendment rights in an inappropriate manner. An
administrative agency was on the right track to protecting "issue advocacy"
but had to stop because it was outside the scope of its power. Ultimately,
either the Court or Congress must find an acceptable way to implement a
middle ground that does not make it a crime
for a group to urge a petition on
1
pending legislation that itfinds important. l°
III.
HARMONIZING THE NEEDS OF CONGRESS WITH THE DEMANDS OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT

Because it is clear that congressional interests and the First Amendment
require a middle ground between Buckley and McConnell, the question is
how to find it."' This comment proposes an exception, similar to the ones
the FEC attempted to create, that would be effective in allowing true "issue
advocacy" while screening out "sham issue ads."
The ultimate goal of any such exception is to allow true issue
advertisements while preventing either implied or express advocacy of a
candidate under the guise of "issue advocacy." ' 1 2 Therefore, for an
exception to function properly, it must focus on the means by which

109. Electioneering Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,145; Electioneering
Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201.
110. McConnell, 540 U.S. 286-88, 320-42 (Kennedy, J. dissenting). See Levine, supra
note 22, at 273 (discussing Kennedy's above mentioned fear of what BCRA had made a
felony). 147 CON. REC. S3022, S3024-25 (daily ed. Mar. 28, 2001) (statement of Sen.

DeWine) (stating his opposition to the BCRA because it would severely limit groups in his
home state from running advertising urging constituents to petition him to take certain

actions).
111. Not all commentators agree that an exception is the appropriate solution. See,
Kuhne, supra note 102, at 645-47 (arguing that the appropriate solution is removal of caps
on contributions with mandatory disclosure of those contributions).
112. See Electioneering Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,136, 51,145 (discussing
four potential exceptions that would exempt true issue ads from becoming "electioneering
communications"); Electioneering Communications 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201-02 (rejecting
all of the earlier proposed potential exceptions on the grounds that they all would allow for
abuses similar to those made by the current "sham issue ads").
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individuals disguise candidate advocacy as "issue advocacy."', 1 3 An
exception that requires an advertisement to satisfy the following five
requirements should effectively screen out sham issue ads.
The first requirement of a valid exception would be that the
advertisement should be as neutral as possible in connotation.' 1 4 Since it is
not always easy to determine exactly what would be too negative or too
positive, the requirement should simply prohibit advertisements from using
loaded words. This could be done with a general definition that is similar to
one already used by the government: Any word
that draws an emotional
5
response far greater than its descriptive value."
The second requirement should be that the advertisment reference only
pending matters.' 16 The exception would have to define pending as any
matter either in a committee or on the floor for debate or vote of the house of
Congress of which the mentioned representative is a member. 1 7 While there
are some grounds for concern that this requirement would not serve to screen
out "sham issue ads," it would certainly help to prevent the advocacy of
things either already resolved but to a contrary position, or not even on the
agenda, that realistically only serve to attack the record of an incumbent

113. See 148 CONG. REC. S2096, 2115 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Levin) (discussing how effective campaign finance reform must screen sham issue ads);
147 CONG. REC. S2433, S2458 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 2001) (statement of Sen. Snowe)
(speaking to the effectiveness of "sham issue ads" and how effective campaign finance
reform must subject them to the rules); Holman, supra note 46, at 259-60 (discussing the
BCRA's attempt to prevent such "sham issue ads"); Hasen, supra note 46, 276-83 (2000)
(discussing the need for regulations that will cover "sham issue ads"); Briffault, supra note
9 at 1777-99, (discussing a means by which the government should attempt to redefine
campaign speech to allow regulation of "sham issue ads").
114. Connotation is a key word here because, unlike other words that are often used to
describe words that suggest a specific bias, connotation can be either positive or negative.
See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 400 (3d ed. 1992) (defining connotation as
"the set of associative implications constituting the general sense of a word in addition to
its literal sense").
115. This is not any less vague than the definition that the Federal Communications
Commission and Supreme Court use for "obscene": Any material that "the average
person.. would find.. appeals to the prurient interest.. .depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct" or has no redeeming "literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1972); Radio Broadcasting; New
Indecency Enforcement Standards, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,386, 16,386 (May 5, 1987) (codified at
47 C.F.R. ch. I). This proposal also reflects some similarity to Federal Rule of Evidence
403, which warrants exclusion of evidence where "probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." FED. R. EVID. 403.
116. See Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,145 (proposing exceptions
3-A and 3-B, which would have exempted ads concerning pending legislation as long as
the other requirements are met).
117. This definition of "pending" stems from Justice Kennedy's dissent, where he
expressed concerns about a groups ability to call to the public's attention an impending
vote in Congress that would affect the group's interests. McConnell, 540 U.S. at
286(Kennedy, J., dissenting). The definition encompasses more situations than the state of
urgency the Kennedy dissent reflects, but it goes to the Kennedy dissent's overriding
theme that the definition of "electioneering communication
"is a severe and
unprecedented ban on protected speech." Id. at 768.
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candidate by suggesting that he either took a position opposite to the one in
the advertisement or did nothing at all.
The third requirement is that the advertisement should only mention the
name of the representative once at the end of the ad. This would serve to
prevent certain creative uses of language that could create an inference of the
position a representative has taken. 1 8 The best example of a potential abuse
that this requirement would prevent is an advertisement that would begin:
"While Representative X has been in Congress.... ." This would clearly
imply that the representative had taken the position that followed.
The fourth requirement should be that the advertisement only mentions
the name of the candidate for the purpose of urging the public to call him and
voice its opinion.' 19
The fifth and final requirement should be that the advertisement
provides the contact information for the representative at the end of the ad,
when the urge to contact is made. This would at least give those that did
draw an inference of position the contact information as opposed to requiring
them to find it on their own. A busy individual might simply take his
inference into the voting booth, rather than take the time to look up the
information, call the representative, and get the position straight from him or
her.
Now, having established a potential framework, the question becomes
whether it works from a practical standpoint. The best way to do this is to
take the WRL issue advertisement mentioned earlier and show that it would
pass the test, while a classic "sham issue ads" would be screened out.
First, the WRL advertisement did not use any words or phrases that
could be classified as "loaded." The closest that the advertisement gets to
this is the phrase, "it's politics at work, causing gridlock and backing up
some of our courts to a state of emergency."'"2 "State of emergency" does
elicit an emotional response, but not to the extent that phrases like "mass
chaos" or "rampant disorganization" would. In addition, while loaded words
would be prohibited, a group framing the issue according to its beliefs would
not. Since the group is correct that, if such filibusters continued there would

118. See Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 65,201, 65,202 (discussing
that all four proposed exceptions could be understood to "promote, support attack, or
oppose" a candidate, but that 3-C, the only alternative that did not create restrictions on
when an incumbent could be named, would specifically serve to completely circumvent
the BCRA).
119. See Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. at 51,145 (proposing exceptions
3-A, 3-B, and 3-D all of which would limit references to an incumbent candidate to a
public request to contact that incumbent regarding the matter).
120. See supra text accompanying note 2 for the full transcript of the ad, but the full
portion quoted is as follows:
Voice-over: Sometimes it's just not fair to delay an important decision. But in
Washington it's happening. A group of senators is using the filibuster delay tactic
to block federal judicial nominees from a simple "yes" or "no" vote. So qualified
candidates don't get a chance to serve. Yes, it's politics at work, causing gridlock
and backing up some of our courts to a state of emergency.
Will, supra note 2, at 72.
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be a judicial shortage, the advertisement would be considered proper under
the first requirement.
The second requirement, that the advertisement involve a pending
matter, is certainly satisfied. The advertisement concerns confirmation of
judicial nominees. 12 1 These nominees were not rejected, but rather the
Senate Democrats used a filibuster to prevent the vote. 122 The Senate is free
to reconsider at any time and vote to break the filibuster. Unless and until
the nominees come to a vote or are withdrawn by the President, the matter is
pending.
The WRL advertisement also satisfies the third requirement, that the
advertisement mention the representative's name once and do so only at the
end of the ad. The advertisement concludes with the line, "Contact Senators
Feingold and Kohl...,,,i23 which is the only time the advertisement ever
mentions the name of anyone in the Senate.
The WRL advertisement only mentions the name of a representative in
conjunction with an urge to call that representative, thereby satisfying the
fourth requirement. It tells viewers to "[c]ontact Senators Feingold and
Kohl,"' 124 which is exactly what is required.
It is unclear whether the advertisement satisfies the fifth requirement,
but it would not be difficult for WRL to edit it so that it does. The
advertisement aired on television and, thus, contact information would fall
out of the scope of the transcript of the ad. However, it is not difficult to
take modern editing equipment and add several seconds of a black screen
with white type containing two telephone numbers.
Next, it must be shown that the requirements would screen out "sham
issue ads." Since such an advertisement only has to fail one requirement to
lose its exemption status, this comment only needs to show the advertisement
fails one.
The Bill Yellowtail advertisement mentioned earlier 25 is a classic
example of "sham issue advocacy" as it discusses how he had abused his
wife. 12 6 It thus fails to meet the pending matters requirement. Personal
matters of a representative are almost never the matters of congressional
action. In1 addition, it mentions his name several times, particularly at the
beginning. 27

121. Id.
122. Id. See Neil A. Lewis, 7th Candidatefor Judgeship Is Blocked By Democrats,

N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2004, at A14.
123. For a full transcript of the ad, see text accompanying note 2, but this note
specifically quotes "Contact Senators Feingold and Kohl and tell them to oppose the
filibuster." Will, supra note 2, at 72.
124. Id.
125. See text accompanying note 9 for the full transcript, but the portions pertinent to
analysis are as follows: "Who is Bill Yellowtail?...[H]e took a swing at his wife. He talks
law and order, but is himself a convicted criminal... Yellowtail failed to make his own
child support payments, then voted against child support enforcement." Briffault, supra
note 9, at 1751.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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A second "sham issue ad" that aired during the 1996 presidential
elections fails on similar grounds. The advertisement was in support of
Republican candidate Bob Dole. 28 The advertisement mentioned Bob
Dole's name multiple times and did not relate to any governmental issue, as
it only stressed Bob Dole's good character.
A third "sham issue ad" that would fail was one that ran against John
McCain when he ran for president in the Republican primary. 29 Not only
did it mention McCain's name multiple times, but it mentioned his opponent,
30
George W. Bush, and compared their records with no urge to contact.
Therefore, the five requirements would allow a true issue advertisement
to run while screening out at least the classic forms of "sham issue ads."

128. The transcript of the advertisement is as follows:
Mr. Dole[:] We have a moral obligation to give our children an America with the
opportunities and values of the nation we grew up in.
Voice over[:] Bob Dole grew up in Russell, Kansas. From his parents he learned
the value of hard work, honesty, and responsibility. So when his country called, he
answered. He was seriously wounded in combat. Paralyzed, he underwent nine
operations.
Mr. Dole[:] I went looking around for a miracle that could make me whole again.
Voice over[:] The doctors said he'd never walk again. But after 39 months, he
proved them wrong.
A man named Ed[:] He persevered, he never gave up. He fought his way back from

total paralysis.
Voice over[:] Like many Americans, his life experience and values serve as a
strong moral compass. The principal of work to replace welfare. The principal of
accountability to strengthen our criminal justice system. The principal of discipline
to end wasteful Washington spending.
Mr. Dole[:] It all comes down to values. What you believe in. What you sacrifice
for. And what you stand for.
148 CONG. REc. S2096, 2115 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen. Levin); Pratt,
supra note 42, at 1676. The ad, unlike the three others that appear in this paper, was paid
for by the candidate's political party. It was chosen because it was paid for by "soft
money" which subjected it to Buckley analysis, which determined it to be "issue
advocacy". 148 CONG. REc. S2096, 2115 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 2002) (statement of Sen.
Levin); Pratt, supra note 42, at 1676.
129. The transcript of this advertisement is as follows:
Voice over: Last year, John McCain voted against solar and renewable energy.
That means more use of coal-burning plants that pollute our air. New York
Republicans care about clean air. So does Governor Bush. He led one of the first
states in America to clamp down on old coal-burning electric power plants. Bush
clean air laws will reduce air pollution more than a quarter million tons a year.
That is like taking five million cars off the road. Governor Bush: Leading so each
day dawns brighter.
Perez-Pena, supra note 46, at A 15.
130. Id.
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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in McConnell was harder than it had to
be on First Amendment rights, but it was better than the existing framework
under Buckley. However, the situation is still not ideal. The ultimate
proposal of this paper is an attempt to find a healthy middle ground that
allows organizations and individuals to openly advocate important issues,
while maintaining a level of integrity in the electoral process.

